2. Three Views of AR and AW

1. Introduction: The New Welfarists

Over the past century or so, concern about animals' interests was limited to ensuring that they were treated "humanely" and that they were not subjected to "unnecessary" suffering. This position, which is known as the animal welfare view, assumes the legitimacy of treating animals instrumentally as means to human ends as long as certain "safeguards" are employed. [FN1]

The late 1970s marked the emergence of the animal "rights" movement, which "retained the animal welfare tradition's concern for animals as sentient beings that should be protected from unnecessary cruelty," but added "a new language of .rights' as the basis for demanding" the end of institutionalized *398 animal exploitation. [FN2] The need to develop a new vocabulary was clear not only in light of certain theoretical inconsistencies between the two positions, but also because the most ardent defenders of institutionalized animal exploitation themselves endorsed animal welfare. Almost everyone-- including those who use animals in painful experiments or who slaughter them for food--accepts as an abstract proposition that animals ought to be treated " humanely" and not subject to "unnecessary" suffering.

As Bernard Rollin writes, rights are "moral notions that grow out of respect for the individual. They build protective fences around the individual. They establish areas where the individual is entitled to be protected against the state and the majority even where a price is paid by the general welfare." [FN3] For example, if X's interest in free speech is protected by a right, that generally means that X's interest will be protected even if the general welfare would benefit from depriving X of that right simply because people strongly disagree with the content of X's speech.

The theory of animal rights maintains that at least some non-humans possess rights that function in a manner substantially similar to human rights. Animal rights ensure that relevant animal interests are absolutely protected and may not be sacrificed even if it would benefit humans to do so, or if the animals whose interests are at stake are exploited "humanely" and without "unnecessary" suffering.

Animal rights theory rejects the regulation of animal exploitation and calls unambiguously and unequivocally for its abolition. Rights theory precludes the treatment of animals exclusively as means to human ends, or as the property of people. Because animals, like humans, possess certain inherent value, that value must be respected regardless of the consequences to humans of ignoring it in favor of treating animals as instruments. The rights theorist rejects the use of animals in experiments, or for human consumption, because such use violates *399 fundamental obligations of justice that humans owe to non-humans, and not simply because these activities cause animals to suffer.

Because the theory of animal rights is fundamentally different from that of animal welfare, a rather significant chasm separates the theory of animal rights from the social phenomenon called the "animal rights movement." Despite this ostensible acceptance of the rights position, the modern animal protection movement has failed to translate the theory of animal rights into a practical and theoretically consistent strategy for social change.

The language of rights is mostly used rhetorically to describe virtually any measure thought to lessen animal suffering. So, a proposal to provide a bit more cage space to animals used in experiments is regarded as promoting animal rights even though such a measure represents a classic example of welfarist reform. Indeed, the modern animal rights movement still embraces the nineteenth-century theory of animal welfare whose primary goal is to ensure that animals, which are regarded as property under the law, are treated "humanely" and not subjected to "unnecessary" suffering.

It would be simplistic, however, to say that the modern animal rights movement is no different from its classical welfarist predecessor. The modern movement understands animal rights as an ideal state of affairs that can be achieved only through continued adherence to animal welfare measures. This hybrid position--that the long-term goal is animal rights but the short-term means are animal welfare reforms--constitutes "new welfarism" whose advocates are the "new welfarists."

It appears as though the new welfarists believe that some causal connection exists between cleaner cages today and empty cages tomorrow, or between more "humane" slaughtering practices today and no slaughtering tomorrow. As a result, the animal "rights" movement, despite its rhetorical use of rights language and its long-term goal of abolishing institutionalized animal exploitation, continues to pursue an ideological and practical agenda that is functionally indistinguishable from measures endorsed by those who accept the legitimacy of at least some forms of animal exploitation.

Two very simple reasons account for the disparity between social theory and practice. First, many animal advocates believe *400 that welfarist reform has helped to ameliorate the plight of non-humans and that such reforms can gradually lead to the abolition of all animal exploitation. Second, although many animal advocates embrace the abolition of animal exploitation as a long-term goal, they regard rights theory as "utopian" and thus incapable of providing concrete normative guidance to inform day-to-day movement strategy and practice.

This article will explore these two assumptions and will argue that welfarist reform has not--and cannot--lead to the abolition of animal exploitation. Animal welfare, especially when applied in an economic system that has strong property notions, has had little, if any, success historically, and is structurally defective, tending to conceptualize the human/animal conflict in ways that ensure that animal interests will virtually never prevail. Moreover, the attribution of a connection between welfare and rights begs a fundamental moral question: If we believe that animals have moral rights today, is it wrong to compromise the rights of animals now, for example, by pursuing or supporting legal changes that facilitate supposedly more "humane" experimentation in the hope that these changes will lead to rights for other animals sometime in the future?

This article will also argue that rights theory provides concrete normative guidance for incremental change. Animal rights theory is not "utopian," and the theory contains a nascent blueprint for identifying incremental changes that will gradually eradicate the property status of animals. The incremental eradication of animal suffering prescribed by classical welfarism, and accepted as the primary normative principle of new welfarism, is per se insufficient to lead to the abolition of institutionalized exploitation. What is needed is the incremental eradication of the property status of animals.

First, Part II briefly describes various views concerning the relationship between animal rights and animal welfare. Part III then explains the theoretical reasons why animal "rights" advocates have rejected rights theory in favor of new welfarism, or the view that while animal rights is the long-term goal, welfarist reform in the short term is the only way to achieve that goal. The fundamental assumptions of new welfarism are examined in Part IV. Finally, Part V presents the preliminary outline of a program for incremental change based on rights theory.
 

Footnotes